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NOTES
THE MAJORITY STATUTE.
On March 25, 1921, the Missouri Legislature approved the
following measure:
"All persons of the age of twenty-one years shall be con-
sidered of full age for all purpose, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law; and until that age is attained, they shall be
considered minors." Page 399 L. Mo. 1921 ;--R. S. Mo. par.
370.
The question arises, hereunder, as to the effect of the
Statute upon the status of women between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one at the date of its effect, viz., June
25, 1921; or, let us say, as to the validity or voidability of
deeds executed by a woman, nineteen on June 25th, 1921,
within the span of her eighteenth and twenty-first birthdays.
It would seem at the outset, there being no express saving
clause, that the burden is on the proponents of the deed to
imply one from the existence of legal fundaments which the
Legislature cannot be taken to ignore.
The question here assumes two different forms. The
first deals with deeds executed by the woman after her attain-
ment of the age of eighteen and before the passage of the
above statute. Clearly such deeds are valid, for it is without
the power of the Legislature to invalidate contracts valid
when made, or to infringe upon rights already vested. Upon
this phase the history of statutes of majority in Missouri
casts some light. In 1831 the age was lowered from twenty-
five to twenty-one; and in 1866 it was lowered from twenty-
one to eighteen as concerned women. How zealously the
court regarded rights already accrued, may be observed in
Reisse v. Clarenbach, 61 Mo. 310. Here a girl of eighteen on
November 7, 1863, raised to majority by the Statute on Aug-
ust 1, 1866, brought an action on July 9, 1869. A three-year
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Statute of Limitation was pleade& But it was held that a
right of exemption from its running could not be affected by
a relation back of the new majority statute. See also, Chubb
v. Johnson, 11 Tex. 469.
The second form of the question deals with deeds executed
by the woman after the passage of the Statute in question
and before her attainment of the age of twenty-one. Vested
rights under contract here accruing after the legislative pro-
nunciation, there can be no question of retro-activity. unless
the status of majority itself, existing prior thereto, be con-
sidered a vested right. Our analysis of the precise nature of
the status of majority inclines us to doubt the existence of
the latter vested right. In these days when status has lost
the formalities that were early its mark, that of majority cai-
mean nothing so far as deeds are poncerned, but the capacity
to make one: a mere fiction of potentiality until it embotiv
itself in an act.-the act. let us repeat, appearing after the
enactment of the act alleged to be retro-aetive. When the
status of agency disappears by contract, and that of mar.
riage by equitable decree, it is difficult to see why the status
of majority cannot be withdrawn by the power of society that
oreated it.
The question of relegation to minority may be said to be up
de ot'o. for the history of our State shows only regressions
of the age limit. And the authorities elsewhere may be ex-
pected to be meager. In the case of Hiestand v. Kuns,
8 Blackf. 345 (Ind.), a woman who was of age (IS) by the law
of the domicile of her origin, was held to be capable of choos.
ing a new domicile, and to be relegated to minority by the law
of the domicile of her choice where the age of majority was
twenty-one. The question being one of guardianship, in
which the law of the domicile always controls, it would seem
that the theory of vested right in status had been abrogated.
However that may be, we submit, that the proponents of the
deed in question must fail to establish its validity in the ab-
sence of an express saving clause, or some paramount rule of
law. H. W.K.
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